In this paper we study social choice within the context of firms or organizations. We model how individual preferences for a course of action are aggregated toward an organizational choice and strategy. To accomplish this aggregation we specifically highlight the role of conditional (rather than categorical) preferences in strategic social choice. We emphasize the role that two factors play in the aggregation of conditional preferences in organizations: (i) acyclical influence (for example, via organizational hierarchy) and (ii) social coherence. We also model the role of 'coordinatability' and mutual information in the context of aggregating heterogeneous preferences in organizations. Our effort is also to contribute to a more contextualized view of social choice by modeling it, in amended form, within the context of organizations.
Introduction
The search for and decision to take a particular "course of action" (Simon, 1964 ) is fundamental to understanding firms and organizations (Barnard, 1938) . However, how a collective course of action emerges in an organization is often left-specifically, in the extant organizational literatureunaddressed by simply focusing on the organization itself as a decision-maker (Barney,1986) . Early conceptions in organizational economics also placed emphasis on a singular "entrepreneurco-ordinator" (Coase, 1937) as the central decision-maker for the organization. While reifying or anthropomorphizing the organization in this fashion has allowed the organizational literature to develop important insights about the behavior of organizations (e.g., the firm-market nexus, industry competition), nonetheless there are central questions that have to do with the "multi-person" firm and the emergence of "convergent expectations" (Malmgren, 1961; March, 1962) and social choices that also deserve consideration. If organizations indeed are composed of "individuals and groups whose preferences, information, interests, or knowledge differ" (March and Simon, 1993, p. 2), and if "administrative activity [indeed] is group activity" (Simon, 1947) , then the aggregation of heterogeneous preferences and information is also central for understanding the behavior of firms (see Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007: 39-40) .
The vast literature on social choice, building on classic work by Arrow (1951) and Sen (1970) , of course has wrestled with important questions related to the aggregation of individual preferences and the emergence of social choices. Indeed, scholars have (relatively) recently also begun to look at possible generalizations and extensions of the Arrovian social choice intuition in the aggregation of judgments, opinions and so forth (e.g., see List and Polak, 2010) .
In this paper we seek to utilize, extend and amend traditional social choice intuition, specifically by using it to study organizational choices. We provide a model illustrating how conditional preferences aggregate within firms toward an organizational choice. We explicate how organizational choices are conditioned by a) influence structures, such as hierarchy, and b) the need for coherence. Our contribution, then, is to offer a more disaggregated view of organizational decision-making by modeling it as a social choice. Scholars have indeed recently argued that "organizational research has been considerably less focused on linking individuals' interests and cognitions to organizations actions and decisions" (Gavetti et al., 2007: 524) . It is to this stream of research that we seek to contribute. We also model the potential 'coordinatability' and strategic possibility associated with heterogenous preferences and mutual information in organizational decision-making. Our effort also is to contribute to a more contextualized view of social choice by modeling it within the context of organizations.
Organizational Choice: From Categorical to Conditional Preferences
The classic approach to aggregating preferences, in the social choice literature, begins with the ex ante specification of individual-level categorical preferences (Arrow 1951; Sen 1970) . Specifically, with categorical preferences "it is assumed that each individual in the community has a definite ordering of all conceivable social states, in terms of their desirability to him . . . It is simply assumed that the individual orders all social states by whatever standard he deems relevant" (Arrow 1951, p. 17) . In other words, an individual comes to social encounters with completely defined categorical preferences and social welfare-maximizing mechanisms are specified from there. Arrow's insight was to prove that the aggregation of heterogeneous categorical preferences can lead to the impossibility theorem.
Organizational decision-making of course requires a different set of assumptions about the nature of preferences. Specifically, the classic social choice approach of specifying categorical preferences ex ante is problematic in the context of organizational decision-making for several reasons. First, organizational activity deals with expectations and decision-making in highly uncertain environments (Barney, 1986) and thus individuals may not meaningfully have strongly pre-specified or categorical preferences or information about all possible states and associated outcomes, independent of others. Thus individuals may actually count on the information that others' preferences and expectations provide them when making a social choice (cf. Gans, 1996) : others' preferences may reciprocally influence one's own preferences beyond just affecting the joint outcome. Indeed, as recognized by Arrow elsewhere: organizations "can acquire more information than any individual" and thus "collective action extends the domain of individual rationality" (Arrow 1974, pp. 16, 53) . Note however that this type of preferential interdependence and influence is not meaningfully taken into consideration in traditional social choice theory since preferences are taken as givens, as categorical.
Second, and even more germane to organizations and firms: as the social choice calculus is often context-free, which indeed is part of it's power, it has not focused on the ex ante structural elements or inter-personal relations that play an important role in organizations. Organizations of course inherently have structural features that shape their choices (e.g., Radner, 1992; Williamson, 1973) . These structural features of organizations are not necessarily determinant of social choices (unless we specify a dictatorship), but rather, as we will highlight, offer a cascading conditioning that plays an important role in shaping choices within organizations.
Third and finally, the outcome of "impossibility" does not generally provide an acceptable or meaningful solution for organizations, specifically where decisions necessarily have to be made and thus additional mechanisms are required for solving problems associated with social choices. Naturally, individuals may, as discussed by Hirschman (1970) , "exit" firms if their preferences are not taken into consideration within an organization (or they may exert "voice"), but additional mechanisms are also feasible.
Overall, while traditional social choice theory offers a very powerful, generalizable framework upon which to also build theories of social choice within firms and organizations, nonetheless additional factors need to be considered within the organizational context. We specifically discuss the role of both categorical (as traditionally specified) and conditional preferences in the emergence of an organizational choice. And, we particularly highlight how the aggregation of conditional preferences occurs within idealized organizational structures (e.g., a hierarchy) and further add the need for "social coherence" when making choices in organizations.
Beyond using the traditional, categorical conception of preferences, we focus on the role of conditional preferences in organizations. Conditional preferences specifically are individual-level preferences and expectations that take others' preferences and expectations into consideration when choosing a collective course of action, thus taking social interactional and influence dynamics into account.
To specify this more formally, let {X 1 , . . . , X n } denote an organization of n agents (i.e., decisionmakers within a firm), and let A denote the (finite) space of choices or alternatives available to these agents. Let us now suppose that as each X i defines its preferences over the alternatives, it takes into consideration the preferences of others. Lett {a 1 , . . . , a n } be an arbitrary set of elements of A such that a j , j = i is hypothesized by X i as the alternative that X j views as the one that should or will be implemented (e.g., a j may be the alternative that is assumed to be most preferred by X j ). This assertion forms the antecedent of a hypothetical proposition, whose consequent is a preference ordering for X i over the elements of A. Such a preference ordering is provisional; it does not commit X i to a course of action. Indeed, much of strategic decision-making largely operates in the domain of provisional preferences and expectations given uncertainty and the need for feedback (Barney,1986) . Definition 1. A conjecture a j ∈ A for X j is a hypothetical assertion that X j views a j as the outcome that should or will be implemented.
Definition 2. A joint conjecture {a 1 , . . . , a n } is a set of possible choices for the organization {X 1 , . . . , X n } such that, simultaneously, X i conjectures a i , i = 1, . . . , n.
Definition 3. Given a joint conjecture {a 1 , . . . , a n }, let ∼ X i = {X 1 , . . . , X i−1 , X i+1 , . . . , X n } denote the subset of agents excluding X i , and let ∼ a i = {a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n }. A conditional utility is a function, u X i |∼X i (a i | ∼ a i ), that defines X i 's utility of conjecturing a i , given that X j conjectures a j for each X j ∈∼ X i . A conditional utility provides X i with the opportunity to adjust its preferences and expectations as a function of the preferences of others. To illustrate, let n = 2. The conditional utility u X 2 |X 1 (a 2 |a 1 ) is the utility of X 2 conjecturing a 2 , given that X 1 conjectures a 1 .
As is evident from the definition, a conditional utility is analogous to a conditional probability, in that both can be viewed as the consequent of a hypothetical proposition whose antecedent is a given conditioning entity. In the probabilistic context, the conditioning entity is an assumption that an event B is realized, and the expression P (A|B) is the conditional probability that the event A will be realized given that the event B is realized. In other words, P (A|B) is the consequent to the hypothetical proposition whose antecedent is the hypothesis that B is realized.
Probability serves as a measure of the degree of subjective belief that an event is true. In this sense, we may think of probability as a measure of epistemological "preference" regarding the event -its epistemological utility. On the other hand, we may also consider preferences in terms of their "usefulness" toward achieving social ends (e.g., Espinas, 1890; von Mises, 1949) .
In other words, preferences can be conditional on the need to achieve a social choice, as is the case in organizational activity where choices may necessarily need to be made by considering others. Whereas probability involves the classification of propositions on the basis of knowledge and subjective belief (about the truth of an event), a focus on "usefulness," on the other hand, involves the classification of actions as a means to an end, the emergence of a collective choice and an organizational strategy. Thus, the consequent u X 2 |X 1 (a 2 |a 1 ) is a measure or the benefit to X 2 of conjecturing a 2 , given the antecedent that X 1 conjectures a 1 . The syntactical similarity between conditional utility and conditional probability permits fundamental "probabilistic" notions to be reinterpreted in the context of their usefulness. Perhaps the most fundamental reinterpretation is independence.
If all agents possess categorical utilities, the organization is said to be mutually independent.
Strategy Choice and Interdependence
A conditional utility u X i |∼X i for a possible social choice does not completely specify the preferences of X i . A complete specification will be possible only during social interaction, when any ambiguity in X i 's preferences is resolved as individuals within the organization interact. To emphasize this situation, we shall refer to conditional utilities as ex ante utilities, meaning that they correspond to the agents' preferences before a social encounter.
Our task is to define an aggregation scheme that is appropriate for conditional utilities. The classical aggregation approach is to define a social welfare function as the weighted sum of individual utilities. As Debreu (1959) has shown, however, that approach is appropriate if, and only if, a condition of mutual preferential independence obtains, that is, if every agent possesses a categorical utility. Thus, we must define an aggregation scheme that is appropriate for conditional preferences and expectations.
As a preliminary step toward defining a social welfare function and choice, let us expand the notion of utility from the individual to the organization.
Definition 5. Let {a 1 , . . . , a n } be a joint conjecture. U X 1 ···Xn (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is the joint conjecture utility of X i conjecturing a i , i = 1, . . . , n. Since a joint conjecture utility is a function of multiple conjectures, it does not directly provide the basis for rational behavior. Rather, it provides a measure of the benefit to an organization as a function of each individual's choices. Of course, necessarily, only one alternative can be chosen for the organization, but the joint conjecture utility would provide a means of assessing the degree of conflict and cooperation that inherently exists in the organization, and will lead to the definition of a social welfare function. Thus, we focus first on investigating the aggregation of individual utilities (categorical and conditional) to form a joint conjecture utility.
To narrow the search for an acceptable aggregation scheme, we impose two conditions: structural hierarchy in the form influence acyclicity and social coherence. As we shall demonstrate, a condition of mutual independence assures that both of these conditions obtain. Thus, assuming these conditions represents a generalization of classical social choice theory.
Hierarchy, Influence, and Aggregation
While traditional aggregation schemes often weight the preferences of agents equally, nonetheless it is important to also model the uniquely 'organizational' aspects of organizational decision-making and strategy. In other words, organizational choices, in some important ways, are not exactly like other social choices (cf. Heiner, 1988) . Many aspects of the organizational context might be emphasized. For example, preferences might be weighted or conditioned on expertise. In part our framework of conditional preferences is generalizable to consider any number of organizational considerations. But while many aspects of the organization might be highlighted, we specifically focus on how simple hierarchical relations among the organizational decision-makers play an important role in aggregating preferences toward an organization-level choice. In other words, the structure of social interactions is important in shaping collective outcomes.
To more formally represent this, consider a hierarchy represented by a graph which is a pair G = (X, E), where X = {X 1 , . . . , X n } is a finite set of vertices and E is a set of edges linking pairs of vertices. If X j 's preferences are directly influenced by X i 's preferences but X j does not directly (though it does indirectly, as we will discuss) influence X i , then there is a directed edge, denoted "→" from X i to X j . A path from X i to X j is a sequence of vertices
We write X i → X j if there is a path from X i to X j . If there are no paths such that X i → X i for any i, the graph is said to be acyclic; if, in addition, all edges are directed, it is a directed acyclic graph (cf. Christofides, 1975) .
If X i → X j , then X i is called a hierarchical relation of X j , the relationship, say, between a manager and a subordinate. In the terminology of graph theory, X i is called a parent of X j . The set of hierarchical relations, or parents, of X i is denoted pa (X i ) = {X i j : X i j → X i }. If X i has no hierarchical relations (as might be the case with a CEO), then pa (X i ) = ∅. The subordinates, or descendants, of X i , denoted de (X i ), is the subset of vertices {X im : X i → X im }. Figure 1 provides an idealized example of hierarchical relations in an organization, illustrating a six-agent directed acyclic graph, or organization with one root node, X 1 , hence pa (X 1 ) = ∅. X 2 is directly influenced by X 1 , thus pa (X 2 ) = {X 1 }. Also, X 3 is influenced by X 1 and X 2 , thus pa (X 3 ) = {X 1 , X 2 }. Similarly, we see that pa (X 4 ) = {X 3 }, pa (X 5 ) = {X 3 }, and pa (X 6 ) = {X 5 }.
Figure 1
Hierarchical relations for an idealized six-member organization.
Let {a 1 , . . . , a n } be a joint conjecture. Given the parent set pa (
is the utility that X i ascribes to a i , given that X i j conjectures a i j , j = 1, . . . , p i . If p i = 0, then X i has no hierarchical relations, and the conditional utility is the categorical utility; that is, u X i | pa (X i ) ≡ u X i if pa (X i ) = ∅. Notice that at least one vertex must be a root node, that is, a node without hierarchical relations (say, the CEO). The graph of a decision problem where all utilities are categorical has no edges -all vertices are root nodes. Thus, the utilities of classical social choice theory are trivially acyclic.
The fact that the relations are acyclical (and not reciprocal) of course reduces the generality of the model. That said, even acyclical (see Figure 1 ) relations allow for indirect "upward" influence as all agents influence the eventual social choice. Though some research has been conducted to account for such reciprocal influence or cycles Kschischang et al. (2001) , in this paper we restrict attention to the acyclic case. Of course, even one-way conditioning, or hierarchical relations, offers novel contextual factors extending social choice theory into the domain of organization theory.
We might also note that while we have broadly abstracted that acyclical influence refers to hierarchy and structure within organizations, nonetheless acyclical influence also naturally generalizes to cases of "expertise," where one-way influence can represent the expertise of particular individuals within the organization rather than their position in the hierarchy. Naturally, expertise and hierarchy are at least to some extent (perhaps dependent on the organization) interdependent in organizations.
Social Coherence and Strategy
Another delimiting condition for our aggregation scheme and social choice is the notion of social coherence. In short, there is a need to specify an extant set of solutions that best reconcile individual preferences and expectations with the chosen organization-level strategies, specifically where individual preferences are not subjugated or marginalized.
Definition 6. Let u X i be a categorical utility for X i and let U X 1 ···Xn be a joint conjecture utility. ···Xn (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) < U X 1 ···Xn (a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a ′ i , a i+1 , . . . , a n )
for all {a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n }. Definition 7. An organization {X 1 , . . . , X n } is socially coherent if no agent can be subjugated; that is, given that u X i (a i ) > u X i (a ′ i ), there exists a set of conjectures {a 1 , . . . , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n } such that
Individual subjugation is equivalent to the notion of suppression as discussed by Hansson (1972) and Fishburn (1973) . An individual is suppressed if, whenever it prefers a to a ′ , then a ′ is preferred to a by the collective.
Avoiding individual subjugation ensures that the preferences of some individuals are not so irreconcilably contrary to the preferences and strategy of the organization that, no matter what the organization decides, the preferences of the affected individuals can never be accommodated. Although individual subjugation is not always avoided in societies, and certaintly not organizations, nonetheless avoiding subjugation naturally is an important feature of an organization that is designed to cooperate.
The question then becomes: what conditions are necessary to impose on the utilities to ensure that individual subjugation does not occur? To address this question we turn to an analogous issue. Specifically, a Dutch book shares similarities and will help us resolve the preference coherence problem. It is a gambling situation such that, no matter what the outcome, the gambler will be worse off for having taken the gamble -a situation of sure loss (one's reward is always less than one's stake).
To illustrate a Dutch book, suppose Y can take one of two distinct values: y 1 or y 2 , and let q(y) denote a belief function of y; that is q(y) measures the strength of belief that Y = y. Without loss of generality, we may restrict belief functions to the unit interval; that is, 0 ≤ q(y) ≤ 1. (We refrain from using the term "probability" here, since we do not require q to possess all of the properties of a probability measure.)
Suppose we have full belief that exactly one of these values obtains, that is, that the disjunction of y 1 and y 2 must occur, and that beliefs are additive, thus, q(y 1 ∨ y 2 ) = q(y 1 ) + q(y 2 ) = 1.
Now let Z take on one of two distinct values z 1 or z 2 , and let r(z, y) denote the belief that Z = z and Y = y simultaneously. Let us now assume that q(y 2 ) > q(y 1 ) but r(z 1 , y 2 ) < r(z 1 , y 1 ) and r(z 2 , y 2 ) < r(z 2 , y 1 ). Suppose you purchase a $1 gamble that Y = y 2 , and deem a fair purchase price to be q(y 2 ); that is, you pay $q(y 2 ) for the gamble to win $1. Now also suppose you sell the gamble (z 1 , y 2 ) ∨ (z 2 , y 2 ). By additivity of beliefs, a fair selling price for this bet would be r[(z 1 , y 2 ) ∨ (z 2 , y 2 )] = r(z 1 , y 2 ) + r(z 2 , y 2 ). However, according to the above ordering, you must have q(y 2 ) > 1 2
and, since r(z 1 , y 2 ) + r(z 2 , y 2 ) < r(z 1 , y 1 ) + r(z 2 , y 1 ), it follows that r[(z 1 , y 2 ) ∨ (z 2 , y 2 )] < 1 2 . After all gambles have been bought and sold, your net wealth is r[(z 1 , y 2 ) ∨ (z 2 , y 2 )] − q(y 2 ) < 0. To overcome this loss, you hope to make up the difference once the outcome of the gamble is known. But if neither y 2 nor (z 1 , y 2 ) ∨ (z 2 , y 2 ) occur, you win nothing and you pay nothing, and if (z 1 , y 2 ) ∨ (z 2 , y 2 ) occurs, then, of course, y 2 occurs, so you win $1 which you must pay to the buyer of your gamble. Thus, your net wealth is invariant to whatever happens -you suffer a sure loss.
A belief system is said to be coherent if it is not possible to construct a Dutch book. The Dutch Book Theorem (Ramsey, 1926; deFinetti, 1937) and its converse (Kemeny, 1955) establish that a belief system is coherent if and only if it complies with a probability measure that describes the degrees of belief regarding the propositions under consideration. Drawing from this epistemological analogy, the following theorem establishes conditions under which sure subjugation cannot occur. Theorem 1. Let {X 1 , . . . , X n } be an organization with a finite alternative space A, and let {a 1 , . . . , a n } be a joint conjecture. Suppose the influence relationships among the agents can be represented by a directed acyclic graph such that the root nodes possess categorical utilities, and whose edges are conditional utilities of the form u X i | pa (X i ) (a i |a i 1 , . . . , a ip i ), where pa (X i ) = {X i 1 , . . . , X ip i } and X i j conjectures a i j , j = 1, . . . , p i . Individual subjugation cannot occur if and only if the utilities u X i | pa (X i ) are conditional mass functions. That is,
and
for all conjectures {a i 1 , . . . , a ip i }. Furthermore, the joint conjecture utility of an organization is
T o establish this result we form an exact analogy between the our previous criterion of the "usefulness" of preferences in coming to a desired collective choice and the degree of belief that an event is true. Define a one-to-one mapping q: A → R. Let {a 1 , . . . , a n } be a joint conjecture, and set α i = q(a i ). For i = 1, . . . , n, let χ i be random variables such that the event χ i = α i occurs if and only if X i conjectures a i . Define the marginal and conditional belief functions as
if pa (X i ) = ∅, and
if X i has p i > 0 parents, in which case pa (χ i ) = {χ i 1 , . . . , χ ip i }. The Dutch Book Theorem and its converse establish that sure loss cannot occur if and only if all belief functions are probability mass functions. Then the marginal mass function p χ i (α i ) is the probability that χ i = α i , and p χ i | pa (χ i ) (α i |α i 1 , . . . , α ip i ) is the conditional probability that χ i = α i given that χ i j = α i j , j = 1, . . . , p i . Thus, to avoid subjugation, the categorical utilities of the root vertices must possess the mathematical structure of marginal probability mass functions and the conditional utilities of non-root vertices must possess the mathematical structure of conditional probability mass functions.
To establish (6), we observe that a fundamental property of a directed acyclic graph is the Markov condition: nondescendent nonparents (i.e. hierarchical relations) of a vertex have no influence on the vertex, given the state of its hierarchical (i.e., parent) vertices (Cozman, 2000) . Consequently, if an organization can be represented as a directed acyclic graph, the conditional utility of an agent (subordinate) is dependent only upon the preferences of its managers in the hierarchy, the vertices and edges of the directed acyclic graph satisfy all of the conditions of a Bayesian network, and we may apply the fundamental theorem of Bayesian networks; namely, that the joint mass function of the vertices is the product of the conditional mass functions of all non-root vertices and the marginal mass functions of all root vertices (Pearl, 1988; Cowell, 1999; Jensen, 2001) . Consequently,
Thus (9) and, equivalently, (6) is simply an application of the law of compound probability, and coherence is established. Applying (6) to an organization represented as a directed acyclic graph, as illustrated in Figure  1 , we obtain the joint utility a 2 , a 3 , a 4 , a 5 , a 6 ) = u X 1 (a 1 )u X 2 |X 1 (a 2 |a 1 )u X 3 |X 1 X 2 (a 3 |a 1 , a 2 ) u X 4 |X 3 (a 4 |a 3 )u X 5 |X 3 (a 5 |a 3 )u X 6 |X 5 (a 6 |a 5 ). (10) This theorem does not mean that if the utilities are not structured according to the theorem then subjugation of individual preferences is sure to occur. Rather, it simply means that, if the utilities are so structured, then subjugation is impossible. This weak notion of equity is a minimal requirement for meaningful negotiations to be possible. Essentially, it means that no individual is categorically disenfranchised; each individual has a "seat at the table" in the sense that it is at least theoretically possible for an individual's most preferred choice to be the outcome most preferred by the organization as well.
We recognize that the use of probability theory in a distinctly non-epistemological context may be disquieting to some readers. The very name "probability theory" tends to confine applications to an epistemological context, although this name stems more from its historical beginnings than from its mathematical structure. It is important to appreciate that probability theory was placed on a solid axiomatic footing by Kolmogorov (1933) , who presented probability in terms of measure theory and established it as an ahistorical and acontextual mathematical study, free of all issues that motivated previous studies.
As a result of this, the structure of social interactions within the organization, where edges comprise conditional utilities that comply with Theorem 1, possesses the mathematical syntax of a Bayesian network, albeit with different semantics.
Just as a multivariate probability distribution contains a complete description of the relationships of a collection of random variables, the joint conjecture utility (6) provides a complete description of the interrelationships among the decision-making agents within the organization. The joint conjecture utility may be used to define a social welfare function. As mentioned earlier, however, the joint conjecture utility does not directly serve as the basis for taking action, since it is a function of multiple actions, and only one can actually be implemented. Thus, we must constrain the joint conjecture utility to a common alternative.
Definition 8. Let {X 1 , . . . , X n } be an organization with joint conjecture utility U X 1 ···Xn . The social welfare function is obtained by evaluating the joint conjecture utility at a common strategy alternative; that is, w X 1 ···Xn (a) = U X 1 ···Xn (a, . . . , a).
The individual welfare function w X i is obtained as the marginal utility
where the notation ∼a i means that the summation is taken over all arguments of U X 1 ···Xn except a i .
The collective-level optimal choice is then
and the individual-level optimal choice is
If a * i = a * c for all i, then a * c is the consensus strategy choice of the organization (a rare situation). Generally, a * i = a * c for some i; in fact, it can happen that a * i = a * c for all i. Thus, conflicts can arise if the interests of all the agents are not perfectly coincident.
Coordination and Possibility
At discussed at the outset, one of the important properties of an organization is the necessity of its members to coordinate and sync their choices (see Malmgren, 1961; March, 1962; Simon, 1964) . By definition, to coordinate is to "cause (things or persons) to function together or occupy their proper place as parts of an interrelated whole" (Brown, 1993) , and thus coordination is central to organizational activity and strategy.
If we are dealing with categorical preferences, the possibility of (apparent) coordination is only realized if agents happen to have perfectly overlapping preferences. But, conflict within the organization and differences of opinion and information are natural, and thus an "expectational equilibrium" (cf. Malmgren, 1961) needs to somehow emerge. True coordination, then, arises because of the social interaction of the members of the organization. If social relationships exist, the corresponding conditional utilities will engender an intrinsic aptitude, or capacity, of the organization to function as an interrelated whole. Although this endogenous coordination capacity may give rise to harmonious behavior as perceived by an outside observer (or even by the agents themselves), the presence of such behavior itself is not a measure of an intrinsic ability or capacity to coordinate.
To measure the overall coordination capacity of an organization, we must restrict our attention to an analysis of the utilities that define the system and organization. Furthermore, this coordination capacity must be defined independently of the rationality concepts possessed by the agents. Fortunately, since the joint conjecture utility essentially is a multivariate mass function and the individual welfare functions are marginals, we may apply the syntax of Shannon's information theory to compute the entropy and mutual information associated with an organization.
Definition 9. The entropy of an organization {X 1 , . . . , X n } with joint conjecture utility U X 1 ···Xn is (for a detailed discussion, see Cover and Thomas (1991) ). ···Xn (a 1 , . . . , a n ) log 2 U X 1 ···Xn (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
The entropy of an individual agent X i with individual welfare function w X i is
Entropy appears in multiple contexts (Shannon and Weaver, 1949; Prigogine, 1955; GeorgescuRoegen, 1971; Bailey, 1990) . In statistical mechanics (Prigogine, 1955) , entropy is a measure of disorder, and measures the inability of a system to convert energy into work. In Shannon's information theory (Shannon and Weaver, 1949) , entropy is a measure of the degree of randomness associated with a phenomenon. Put differently, entropy essentially is measure of the intrinsic potential or capacity to make a wrong guess. If most of the probability mass is concentrated on a single outcome, then the capacity to guess wrong is small (low entropy), but if the probability mass is more or less evenly distributed among the outcomes, then the capacity to make a wrong guess is large (high entropy).
The flipside of uncertainty of course relates to the associated increase in choice-related possibility. Entropy, thus, also measures the latent choice possibilities open to the organization, the amount of freedom in constructing a collective choice (cf. Shannon and Weaver, 1949) , Thus, the inter-relation between coordination and strategic possibility represents two ends of the spectrum.
Justification of the use of entropy in a social choice setting requires some further explanation. As entropy essentially may represent the amount of uncertainty in decision making, opportunity cost may be an appropriate analogue. Opportunity cost is traditionally defined as the utility of the next-best alternative. If most of the utility mass is concentrated on a single action, then the opportunity cost is small (low entropy). On the other hand, if the utility mass is evenly distributed among the actions, then the opportunity cost is large (high entropy).
In a traditional probabilistic context, the joint probability mass function of mutually independent discrete random variables is the product of the individual univariate mass functions, and the joint entropy is the sum of the individual entropies. When dependencies exist, however, the joint entropy is less than the sum of the individual entropies. The difference between the sum of the individual entropies and the joint entropy, called the Kulback-Leibler divergence, provides a useful measure of the degree to which dependencies reduced the randomness in a collective of random variables.
We may also compute this difference in a social choice setting. We first observe that if all decision makers possess categorical utilities, then there is no structural social relationship and, hence, no true coordination as we have defined the concept in this paper (although the decision makers may cooperate if their interests are compatible). But when social relationships exist among the decision makers, the Kulback-Leibler divergence provides a measure of the degree of coordination that exists among the agents.
Definition 10. The mutual information associated with an organization with a joint conjecture utility U X 1 ···Xn and individual welfare functions w X i is the Kullback-Leibler divergence Kullback and Leibler (1951) , given by
Mutual information is a measure of the "distance" between a joint utility and the product of the individual welfare functions. It has been shown by Kraskov et al. (2003) that entropy and mutual information used together provide, in the case n = 2, a true metric.
Theorem 2. The function d(X 1 , X 2 ) = H(X 1 , X 2 ) − I(X 1 ; X 2 ) possesses the following properties:
where the notation X 1 = X 2 means that there is a one-to-one function mapping X 1 to X 2 . This distance measure is maximum when X 1 and X 2 are independent, in which case d(X 1 , X 2 ) = H(X 1 ) + H(X 2 ).
As pointed out in Kraskov et al. (2003) , a more useful metric is obtained by dividing d(X 1 , X 2 ) by the joint entropy, yielding
11
This function measures relative distance between the two utilities. It is clearly symmetric and non-negative by inspection. The proof that D satisfies the triangle inequality is also provided in Kraskov et al. (2003) . When n ≥ 3, we may expand the definition of d(X 1 , . . . , X n ) to become
This function is symmetric, non-negative, and is zero if and only if X 1 = · · · = X n . We interpret d(X 1 , . . . , X n ) as a dispersion measure; that is, a measure of how much the utilities of the collective are in conflict. The smaller the dispersion measure, the more tightly the preferences of the agents are clustered. d(X 1 , . . . , X n ) achieves its maximum when all of the X i 's are mutually independent, in which case d(X 1 , . . . , X n ) = (n − 1)
Although not a metric when n ≥ 3, D(X 1 , . . . , X n ) is symmetric, non-negative, and D(X, . . . , X) = 0, and again, assumes a maximum value of unity when the agents are independent of each other. Definition 12. The 'coordinatability' function of a collective {X 1 , . . . , X n } is the difference between unity and the relative dispersion measure.
The coordinatability function measures the degree to which the preferences of X 1 , . . . , X n coincide. If X 1 = · · · = X n , then D(X 1 , . . . , X n ) = 0, the ability to coordination is maximized, and the optimal behavior is for all agents to help themselves by helping others. At the other extreme, if the agents are independent, D(X 1 , . . . , X n ) = 1, the ability to coordinate is minimized, and the optimal behavior is for each agent to do what is best for itself, regardless of the effect on others, which of course might lead to the breakdown of collective action. This latter case is the operative condition for classical social choice theory, where all utilities are categorical. We hasten to add that a lack of an intrinsic capacity to coordinate does not mean that the agents cannot achieve a harmonious solution (recall that the ability to coordinate is not based on a rationality concept). Rather, it means, if they do behave harmoniously, it is by coincidence, based on the juxtaposition of their utilities, and not because of an explicit social relationship between them. In other words, coordinatability is a structural attribute of the organization rather than a performance attribute. Coordinatability does not directly help the agents make choices. Rather, it gives them an understanding of the ambivalance associated with the choices. It does not tell them what the opportunity costs are, but it does tell them whether they are high or low. It provides a quantifiable measure of the intrinsic difficulty in making joint decisions, as well as a measure of the intrinsic ability for the agents to coordinate their choices. Consequently, coordinatability may be viewed as meta knowledge that will help the decision makers more completely to understand just how fit, or adapted, they are to address the decision problem they are facing.
Conclusion and Future Directions
Our goal in this paper has been to highlight and model how conditional preferences and expectations might be aggregated toward a social choice and organizational strategy. While traditional models of social choice are based on the aggregation of categorical preferences (which are given prior to social interaction), we explicitly recognize that within organizational settings "values must be compromised because other [have] different values and no social action is possible at all without some element of cooperation and, in particular, agreement" (Arrow 1974, p. 27) . This need to compromise of course might also be seen as the need to learn and be influenced by others, thus recognizing the uncertainty associated with organizational choices and strategy-making.
Our study of social choice in organizational settings of course has many limitations, which also provide an opportunity for future work. First, as discussed at the outset, organizational decisionmaking, particular vis-a-vis the general direction and strategy of an organization, inherently occurs in uncertain environments and thus matters of expertise, learning and feedback need to be taken into account. While our focus is on the emergence of a social choice itself, naturally the emergence of this choice does not necessarily mean that it will lead to anticipated outcomes. Thus there is an opportunity to study and explicate the mechanisms for revisiting social choices, requiring additional work on learning, the development of expertise, the role of feedback and so forth. In other words, our focus on the coordinatability and strategic possibility of choices focuses on the organization itself and thus is neutral vis-a-vis (and independent of) whether the social choices are actually objectively "correct" or not. Thus, additional links with the behavioral theory of the firm provide an opportunity for future work. Organizations may find internal equilibria in their choice sets, but these naturally have to be tested against the environment, which then requires us to study repeated social choices and the mechanisms of adaptation and learning over time.
Second, to be parsimonious we have modeled organizational structures and interpersonal relations (such as hierarchy) as acyclical relationships, though cyclical and reciprocal influence structures provide a natural opportunity for future work. Furthermore, our focus on structure has specifically anchored on hierarchy, though naturally there are many additional aggregational mechanisms and associated interactional structures that might be utilized (Knudsen and Levinthal, 2007; cf. Hurwicz, 1973; Austen-Smith and Banks, 2005) , and these structures themselves may also be emergent within organizations. Thus there is an opportunity for future research to model the endogenous features of the aggregation mechanisms and structures that lead to the emergence of social choices and organizational strategy.
